Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy
Volume 22

Issue 1

Article 29

1-1-2017

Constitutional Law - Tipping the Scale: Extending Scope of Brady
Application for the Sentencing Phase in Post-Conviction Cases United States v. Hampton, 109 F. Supp.3D 431 (D. Mass. 2015)
Natasha A. Desa
Suffolk University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.suffolk.edu/jtaa-suffolk
Part of the Litigation Commons

Recommended Citation
22 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 246 (2016-2017)

This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Collections @ Suffolk. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Suffolk Journal of Trial and Appellate Advocacy by an authorized editor of Digital Collections @
Suffolk. For more information, please contact dct@suffolk.edu.

CONSTITIONAL LAW-TIPPING THE SCALE:
EXTENDING SCOPE OF BRADY APPLICATION

FOR THE SENTENCING PHASE IN POSTCONVICTION CASES-UNITED STATES V
HAMPTON, 109 F. SUPP. 3D 431 (D. MASS. 2015).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a federal prisoner has the right to
collaterally attack his or her sentence if it was imposed unconstitutionally.'

See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2008). Section 2255 in relevant part states:
(a) A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States ... may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
(b) Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the
prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the
United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make
findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto, If the court finds that the
judgment was rendered without jurisdiction.., or that there has been such a denial or
infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to render the judgment
vulnerable to collateral attack, the court shall vacate and set the judgment aside and shall
discharge the prisoner or resentence him or grant a new trial or correct the sentence as
may appear appropriate.
(c) A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production
of the prisoner at the hearing.
(d) An appeal may be taken to the court of appeals from the order entered on the motion
as from a final judgment on application for a writ of habeas corpus.
(e) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized
to apply for relief ... shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to
apply for relief ... to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation
period shall run from the latest of
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if
the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(g) Except as provided in section 408 of the Controlled Substances Act, in all
proceedings brought under this section, and any subsequent proceedings on review, the
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Generally, post-conviction motions are analyzed under the Due Process
standard established in the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland, where the
defendant claimed constitutional violations because the government
suppressed evidence favorable to the accused.2 In United States v. Hampton
the court considered whether a defendant's right to Due Process was violated
because the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed based on a state lab
chemist's willful tampering of evidence.3 The United States District Court
held, as a matter of first impression, that although egregious government
misconduct did not support the motion for post-conviction relief, the state
lab chemist's willful tampering of evidence was a Brady violation.4

court may appoint counsel, except as provided by a rule promulgated by the Supreme
Court pursuant to statutory authority ....
(h) A second or successive motion must be certified as provided in section 2244 by a
panel of the appropriate court of appeals to contain
(1) newly discovered evidence that ... would be sufficient to establishby clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant
guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review
by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
Id. This statute provides fundamental rights for all citizens. Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " Id. The
defendant's right to a fair trial in federal court under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is
similarly guaranteed in state court under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV §11.
2 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (establishing that integral part of fair trial
includes prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence). Generally, section 2255 does not
apply to errors in application of the Sentencing Guidelines unless such errors constitute a
miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Cofske v. United States, 290 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding
application of Sentencing Guidelines error not cognizable absent "complete miscarriage of
justice"); United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 283-84 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding relief only
available under section 2255 if sentence exceeds statutory maximum); United States v. Williamson
183 F.3d 458, 462 (5th Cir. 1999) (explaining section 2255 applicable when raising constitutional
issues resulting in miscarriage of justice); Jones v. United States, 178 F.3d 790, 796 (6th Cir. 1999)
(finding no error in application of Sentencing Guidelines "absent a complete miscarriage of
justice"); United States v. Wisch, 275 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding error in Sentencing
Guidelines generally not reviewable under section 2255); Hunter v. United States, 559 F.3d 1188,
1191 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding errors in sentencing "generally not cognizable in a collateral
attack"), vacated, 558 US. 1143 (2010). But see Thunderv. United States, 810 F.2d 817, 822-23
( 8 t h Cir. 1987) (finding section 2255 claim valid based on court's reliance on factually inaccurate
presentence investigation report); United States v. Garfield, 987 F.2d 1424, 1426-28 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding cognizable section 2255 claim of failure to resolve factual dispute in petitioner's
presentence report).
' See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (holding state lab chemist's willful tampering of
evidence violated Due Process).
4 See id The court found no egregious government misconduct because defendant did not
indicate he would have plead guilty had he known the state lab chemist had tampered with
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Defendant, Dewayne Hampton, was convicted on one count of
knowingly and intentionally conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of
cocaine base.5 The government asserted the indictment was premised on a
ten-month investigation, during which Hampton was involved in twenty
sales of approximately twenty-eight grams and approximately fourteen
grams of crack cocaine to a cooperating witness, and one sale involving
approximately six grams of crack cocaine, each transaction secretly recorded
on video and audio.6 "An additional fifty grams of crack cocaine were seized
from Hampton's residence during his arrest."7 Eighteen of the purchases
were tested at the Hinton State Laboratory ("state lab") in Jamaica Plain,
where Annie Dookhan worked and was the primary or secondary chemist for
fourteen samples. 8 All samples tested positive for cocaine. 9
In June 2011, Dookhan's supervisors discovered, that without
authorization, she took evidence from a safe, removed ninety drug samples
from the office, and forged a co-worker's initials on the evidence log.'0

numerous drug samples, and defendant did not involuntarily plead guilty to quantity of drugs for
which he was charged. Id.
' See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 431. "Hampton, along with co-defendants Willie Brown
("Brown") and Ashley Clark ("Clark"), was a member of a drug distribution conspiracy." Id. at
432. On September 3, 2009, all three defendants were arrested. Id. at 434. "All defendants were
indicted on one count of knowingly and intentionally conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams
of cocaine base, inviolation of 21 U.S.C. § § 846 and 841 (a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)." Id. Clark and Brown
pled guilty on February 10, 2011. Id. "Clark was sentenced to time served (four days) plus twentyfour months of supervised release. Brown was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of sixty
months, followed by four years of supervised release." Id.
6 Id. at 433. Under the direction of law enforcement, a cooperating witness "allegedly
purchased the 350 grams of crack cocaine from three defendants during the twenty-one controlled
sales," all of which were monitored by police and surveillance. Id. at 432.
7 Id. at 433. See Opp'n to Dewayne Hampton's Mot. to Vacate ("Govt. Br.") at 7, United
States v. Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d 431 (D. Mass 2015) (No. 09-10281). However, no testing was
conducted on the fifty grams of substance seized from Hampton's residence during his arrest. Id.
8 See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 433. Dookhan performed the role of both primary and
confinnatory chemist during her time at the state lab. The state lab used two levels of testing. Id.
The primary chemist was responsible for performing simple bench top tests, and then prepared a
sample of the substance for the "confirmatory chemist." Id. The confirmatory chemist ran the
substance through a machine that produced instrument-generated documentation of gas results,
which was then conferred by both chemists to confirm consistent results. Id. After these two levels
of testing were completed, the primary chemist prepared a drug certificate that included notarized
signatures by both chemists. Id. See also Commonwealthv. Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530, 538 (Mass. 2014)
(stating drug lab issued drug certificate identifying substance).
9 See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (discussing Hampton's arrest and substance testing).
In addition to the substances that were tested by a Drug Enforcement Agency, law enforcement
agents field tested the substances received, which on at least one occasion also brought about a
positive result for cocaine. Id.
10 See Petitioner's Supplemental Memorandum, United States v. Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d
431 (D. Mass. 2015) (No. 09-10281). The incident was reported to the Norfolk District Attorney
in February 2012, and Dookhan went on administrative leave in February 2012, and resigned on
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Dookhan was charged in the Massachusetts Superior Court with twenty-nine
crimes, including perjury, obstruction of justice, tampering with evidence,
and falsely claiming to hold a degree." In November 2013, Dookhan pled
guilty to twenty-seven counts and was sentenced to three to five years in
prison, followed by two years of probation.12 Hampton claimed that due to
the case brought against Annie Dookhan, and related evidence tampering, he
should be entitled to relief' 3 However, Hampton was unable to provide any
evidence that Dookhan tampered in any way with the samples submitted to
the laboratory from his case. 14
On April 27, 2011, Hampton pled guilty to one count of knowingly
and intentionally conspiring to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine."
Even though Hampton pled guilty to the conspiracy, his counsel emphasized
that this was not specific to "any particular transaction or any particular
amount [of cocaine base] at this point.' 6 "At the sentencing, Judge Gertner
accepted the computations of crack cocaine from the Presentence Report,
which calculated the substance attributable to Hampton to exceed 280
grams.' 7 "Judge Gertner sentenced Hampton to the mandatory minimum

March 9, 2012. See Ex. A, Investigation Drug Lab. William A. Hinton State Lab. Inst. 2002 2012
63, 65, ECF No. 113 1. The lab eventually closed after further investigation. Id.
11 See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 433 (highlighting twenty-seven counts Dookhan was
charged with and subsequently pled to). A judge ordered Dookhan to serve three to five years in
prison, followed by two years of probation. Id.
12 See id.Discovery in the case revealed that Dookhan breached lab protocol by:
[C]ertifying, without testing, that a substance was the suspected drug; placing samples
from different cases together on her bench; 'batching' samples together and testing some
but not others; intentionally contaminating a sample by using a known drug from a
completed test; falsifying other chemists' initials on quality control/confirmatory
documents; falsely certifying having run quality control/confinnatory test samples;
failing to properly calibrate her scales to ensure the accuracy of the drug weights
measured by the chemist; and communicating directly with prosecutors about specific
cases.
Id.at 433-34.
13 See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 432 (alleging Dookhan's misconduct in drug testing
requires resentencing).
14 See id.
at 434. Although the previous case against Dookhan led to discovery of breached
protocol, there was no evidence produced in the current case of any tampering of samples submitted
to the laboratory from the sales by Hampton. Id.
15 Id.(indicating Hampton initially pleaded not guilty before changing his plea).
16 Id. Judge Gertner told Hampton, "the 'precise amounts [of crack cocaine] that you're
responsible for ...will be something we will figure out at sentencing."' Id.
17 Id.at 434-35. "The government attributed nearly 400 grams to Hampton. Fifty were taken
from his home upon his arrest and were not tested. Almost 270 grams were tested by Dookhan. 52
grams were tested and stored by other chemists at the state lab. 28 grams were tested by the DEA
laboratory." See Mot. Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence Person Federal Custody, Ex. 1, Mot.
Vac. Plea Alternative, Vacate Sentence, Pursuant 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Def. Br."), United States v.
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often years, followed by sixty months of supervised release."' 8 On August
10, 2011, Hampton appealed his sentence to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit, moved to dismiss his appeal, and the First
Circuit granted the motion.' 9 Hampton filed the instant petition on August
21, 2013, arguing that the court should vacate his sentence because the
prosecutor's failure to disclose Dookhan's misconduct was in violation of
his right to Due Process under the Brady standard. 0

Hampton, (No. 09-10281-WGY) (arguing grounds for relief under violation of Sixth Amendment).
The motion argues that Hampton's Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was
convicted and sentenced for an offense for which he was not indicted, and which was not proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Furthermore, because the government failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence, Hampton's right to Due Process was violated and, thus, he is entitled to resentencing. Id.
Finally, the motion argues that in the alternative, Hampton has the right to be resentenced because
egregious government misconduct tainted the sentence that Judge Gertner imposed. Id.
18 Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 434-35. InHampton, the court stated:
[J]udge Gertner began with a sentencing level of thirty-two for the amount of cocaine
base. She added two levels for being an organizer/leader and subtracted three levels for
acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a sentencing level of thirty-one. Hampton had
a criminal history of V, which resulted in a sentencing guidelines range of 168 210
months. Judge Gertner nevertheless sentenced Hampton to the statutory minimum of
120 months.
Id. at 435 n.4.
19 See id at 435 (explaining procedural history of case).
20 See id. A section 2255 motion is the proper means to challenge the validity or lawfulness
of a conviction. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (2008); see, e.g., Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198,
203 (2001) (holding section 2255 constitutional violation for ineffective assistance of counsel led
to sentencing error); see also, Mateo v. United States, 398 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding
section 2255 claims for unknowing and involuntary guilty plea); Guerrero v. United States, 186
F.3d 275, 277 (2nd Cir. 1999) (contending Sixth Amendment violation of per se ineffective
assistance of counsel under section 2255); United States v. Booth, 432 F.3d 542, 550 (3rd Cir.
2005) (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel allowed under section 2255); United States v.
Brown, 155 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding double jeopardy violation cognizable under
section 2255); United States v. Grammas, 376 F.3d 433, 436-37 (5th Cir. 2004) (noting ineffective
assistance of counsel claim appropriately brought in section 2255 motion); Dunham v. United
States, 486 F.3d 931, 933 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding claims of double jeopardy and ineffective
assistance of counsel brought in section 2255 motion); Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754,
758 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding same); Bear Heels v. United States, 993 F.2d 1325, 1325 (8th Cir.
1993) (holding double jeopardy violation cognizable under section 2255); Shukwit v. United States,
973 F.2d 903, 904 (11th Cir. 1992) (ruling petitioner sentenced because of false information in
presentence report cognizable under section 2255). But see Nichols v. United States, 563 F.3d 240,
250-51 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding defendant had no 6th Amendment right to counsel in discretionary
appeals).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Title 28 US.C.§ 2255
In 1948, Congress passed Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255,21 which is the
principal statutory basis for relief for prisoners challenging the legality of his
or her sentence.22 To obtain relief under section 2255, the petitioner must
prove exceptional circumstances demanding redress to successfully vacate,
set aside, or correct a sentence. 23 Specifically, claims arising from the
government withholding exculpatory evidence, fall under violations of the

21

See 62 Stat. 869, 869, 967-68 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2016)) (June 25,

1948) (stating that to "revise, codify, and enact into law title 28 of the United States Code entitled
'Judicial Code and Judiciary"'). Section 2255 was one of several post-conviction reforms passed
in this Act pursuant to the recommendations of the Judicial Conference Committee, which was
formed in 1942 to address the increase in post-conviction appeals. See also Hon. John J. Parker,
Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171, 173-74 (1948-1949) (discussing creation of
Judicial Conference Committee and petitions for habeas corpus).
22 See David v. United States, 134 F.3d 470, 474 (1st Cir. 1998). Section 2255 "provides for
post-conviction relief in four instances, namely, if the [defendant's] sentence (1) was imposed in
violation of the Constitution, or (2) was imposed by a court that lacked jurisdiction, or (3) exceeded
the statutory maximum, or (4) was otherwise subject to collateral attack." Id.(citing Hill v. United
States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962)). The "fourth category includes only assignments of error that
reveal 'fundamental defects' which, if uncorrected, will 'result[] in a complete miscarriage of
justice,' or irregularities that are 'inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure."'
Id.at 474. Simply put, "apart from claims of constitutional or jurisdictional nature, a cognizable
section 2255 claim must reveal 'exceptional circumstances' that make the need for redress evident."
Id. See also DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
HANDBOOK WITH FORMS § 1:15 (2016). As previously mentioned, Due Process violations,
violations of the Confrontation Clause, and inadequate representation by counsel are all grounds
for post-conviction appeals. See id.§ 1:15 at 12-13. See also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, NANCY J.
KING,AND SUSAN R. KLEIN, 3 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 594 at 701-710 (West 3rd
ed. 2004) (listing grounds under bringing section 2255 petitions for federal post-conviction
appeals).
23 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (2017). The statue in relevant part provides: "[an application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion
pursuant to this section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply
for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him .... Id.; see also Rules Governing Section
2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, R. 1 (2010), available at
www.uscourts.gov/file/rules-governing-section-2254-and-section-225 5-proceedings
(citing
section 2255 motions granted to district court judge from movant's trial and sentencing). See, e.g.,
United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999) (filing section 2255 motion in
sentencing court); Pack v. Yusuff, 218 F.3d 448, 451 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding section 2255 motions
attacking sentencing errors must be filed in sentencing court); Nichols v. Symmes, 553 F.3d 647,
649 (8th Cir. 2009) (noting section 2255 motion attacking validity of conviction must be filed in
sentencing court); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008) (ruling section 2255
motions contesting legality of sentence should be filed in sentencing court); Bradshaw v. Story, 86
F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996) (emphasizing if court previously denied, then section 2255 motions
should not be reheard).
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Due Process standard established in the iconic decision of Brady v.
Maryland.24
B. Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose ExculpatoryEvidence (Brady v.
Maryland)
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court specified the prosecutorial
role in promoting constitutional Due Process in the critical case of Brady v.
25
Maryland.
The Brady Court held that a criminal defendant's right to Due
Process is violated when the government suppresses exculpatory evidence
that is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or
bad faith of the prosecution.26 Effectively, the Court announced a new rule
that the defendant or reduce the penalty. 27 To establish a Brady violation,

the defendant must show: 1) that the evidence at issue is favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; 2) that
evidence was purposefully or inadvertently suppressed by the State; and 3)

24 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).

The Brady rule imposes a constitutional duty

on the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence. Id. See also Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary
Sanctions Against ProsecutorsforBrady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REv. 693, 696
(1987) (explaining ethical rules requiring prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence).
"Exculpatory evidence" is defined as:
[A] statement or other evidence which tends to justify, excuse or clear the defendant
from alleged fault or guilt. Declarations against declarant's interest which indicate that
defendant is not responsible for crimes charged. Evidence which extrinsically tends to
establish defendant's innocence of crimes charged as differentiated from that which
although favorable, is merely collateral or impeaching. For purposes of rule constraining
State from disposing of potentially exculpatory evidence, is evidence which clears or
tends to clear accused person from alleged guilt.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
25

(6th ed. 1991).

373 U.S. at 87 (establishing prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence as integral

part of right to fair trial); see also Rosen, supra note 24, at 695. A prosecutor has an obligation to
ensure the results of a trial have been accurately determined, especially when a guilty verdict is
rendered. Id.
26 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 88. Petitioner Brady and a co-defendant were both convicted of firstdegree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 84. The co-defendant made several statements, one
of which he confessed that he, and not the petitioner, committed the murder by himself Id.
Prosecutors withheld the co-defendant's statement that exculpated the petitioner. Id. The United
States Supreme Court held that Brady was entitled to resentencing because suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused by the prosecution violates Due Process "where the evidence is material
either to guilt or to punishment, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at
87. The Supreme Court affirmed the state court's ruling that Brady was not entitled to a new guiltinnocence trial. Id. at 90.
27 See id. at 87 ("We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.").
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caused prejudice. 28 The Brady materiality requirement is highly probative
evidence that could have had an impact to either guilt or punishment. 29 Since
the inception of the Brady doctrine, which is commonly referred to as "Brady
evidence" or "Brady material," case law, statutes, and various state and
federal rules of criminal procedure have significantly expanded and
progressed the doctrine.g3

28 See id. at 86-87. Exculpatory evidence must be disclosed even if the prosecutor does not

find the information credible or has other contradictory information. Id. at 87-88. This extends to
evidence tending to exculpate due only to its tendency to impeach the credibility of government
witnesses. Id. See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (discussing evidence
suppressed must have affected punishment not conviction). The Court reflected on a prosecutor's
obligation of fairness and stated, "the prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary: he 'is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty ... whose interest...
in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."' Id. at 675
n.6 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). "'[D]ue process requires fairness,
integrity and honor in the operation of the criminal justice system' and, therefore, standards of
professional conduct for prosecutors may help in determining when a defendant's Due Process
rights have been violated." Moranv. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 467 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
"When a prosecutor intentionally defies the standards set forth to govern his or her behavior, such
conduct cannot be tolerated because it undermines the integrity and honor encompassed within Due
Process." Id.
29 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (describing importance of materiality). The Brady materiality
requirement is satisfied by a showing of "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put
the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles v. Whitley,
514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The defense must also show that the withheld
evidence was noncumulative, highly probative evidence that could have had an impact to either
guilt or punishment. Id. at 469-70. The Court has stated that a defendant does not have to prove
that he would have been acquitted had the Brady evidence been presented at trial but must show
that, in the absence of the evidence, he did not receive a fair trial "resulting in a verdict worthy of
confidence." Id. at 434.
30 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 (imposing duty on prosecution to "learn of any favorable
evidence known" by others helping investigation); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676 (finding impeachment
evidence as constitutionally equivalent to exculpatory evidence); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.
97, 110 (1976) (discussing government's obligation to disclose material exculpatory evidence);
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972) (placing affirmative duty on government to
share relevant information with all interested parties); see also Banksv. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 67577 (2004) (reversing because prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence that allow two
witnesses to commit perjury); Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (emphasizing
prosecution's crucial role and duty to disclose exculpatory evidence). But see Kyles, 514 U.S. at
460-61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (declaring defendant's burden of proof that exculpatory evidence
creates reasonable doubt). "It is simply not enough to show that the undisclosed evidence would
have allowed the defense to weaken or even to 'destroy' ... the particular prosecution witnesses
or items of prosecution evidence to which the undisclosed evidence relates." Id. at 460; Bagley,
473 U.S. at 685 (White, J., concurring in part) (opposing expansion of materiality standard to
specific requests for disclosure by defendant). In Massachusetts, "a defendant seeking a new trial
because of newly discovered evidence must establish both that the evidence is newly discovered
and that it casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction." Commonwealth v. Pike, 726 N.E.2d
940, 945 (Mass. 2000). The evidence must be material, credible, and "carry a measure of strength
in support of the defendant's position." See Commonwealth v. Grace, 491 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Mass.
1986). "A defendant must also show that the evidence was unknown to the defendant or the
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II. BRADY DEVELOPMENT
A. United States v.Agurs
Following the Brady decision, several Supreme Court cases have
expanded the nature and scope of prosecutorial disclosure obligations. 3' In
1976, the Agurs court determined that even when a defendant has not made
a specific request for exculpatory evidence, it may still be a Due Process
violation for a prosecutor to suppress such evidence.3 2 In turn, the

defendant's counsel, and not discoverable through 'reasonable pretrial diligence' at the time of trial
or at the time of the presentation of any earlier motion for a new trial." Pike, 726 N.E.2d at 945-46.
The motion judge decides not whether the verdict would have been different, but rather
whether the new evidence would probably have been a real factor in the jury's
deliberations... This process of judicial analysis requires a thorough knowledge of the
trial proceedings, and can, of course, be aided by a trial judge's observation of events at
trial.
Commonwealth v. Moore, 556 N.E.2d 392, 399 (Mass. 1990) (quoting Commonwealth v. Grace,
491 N.E.2d 246, 248 (Mass. 1986)).
31 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (placing affirmative duty on prosecution to disclose Brady
evidence); Thitley, 514 U.S. at 436-38 (requiring prosecution "learn of any favorable evidence
known" by anyone acting for government helping investigation); Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676
(extending exculpatory Brady evidence to any evidence tending to impeach credibility of
government witnesses). The Court also clarified the materiality prong of Brady, stating that
evidence is material "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id.at 682.
32 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112 (finding prosecution must disclose exculpatory evidence that "creates
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist"). Petitioner was convicted of murder after a trial in
which he argued that he had acted in self-defense. Id.at 98-99. Subsequently, petitioner sought a
new trial because the state had failed to disclose the victim's criminal record. Id.at 100. The United
States Supreme Court held that there was little difference between a general request by defense
counsel for Brady material and the absence of a request altogether, and it also found that prosecutors
are obligated to turn over exculpatory evidence regardless of whether defense counsel asks for it.
Id.at 117. See id.at 103 (discussing applicability of Brady v. Maryland). The Agurs Court noted
three different scenarios in which failure to disclose exculpatory evidence may require relief: (1)
when the prosecution benefits from use of perjured testimony; (2) when defense counsel has made
a specific request for discovery; and (3) when the prosecutor has access to exculpatory evidence
not disclosed to the defense. See id.The Court stated, "[a prosecutor] must always be faithful to
his client's overriding interest that 'justice shall be done,"' even if it is detrimental to the State's
overall case. Id. at 111 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)); see also Bagley,
473 U.S. at 676 (holding Brady requires disclosure of impeachment evidence). In Bagley, the
defendant was indicted on firearms and narcotics charges. Id. at 669. Prior to trial, he requested
that the prosecution disclose any "deals, promises, or inducements made to witnesses in exchange
for their testimony." Id.(White, J., concurring in part and concurring injudgment). The prosecution
withheld infornation that its two principal witnesses worked with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms ("ATF") in an undercover investigation of respondent. Id. Respondent sought a new
trial under Brady. Id. at 688. The Court reversed the order and remanded for a determination of
whether the prosecutor's withholding of evidence was material in that it would have affected the
outcome of the trial. Id.at 684 (majority opinion).
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Court further defined the prosecution's responsibilities by imposing
an affirmative duty on the government to disclose material exculpatory
evidence, even if the defense has not specifically requested such evidence.33
Thus, it is no longer relevant for defense counsel to request exculpatory
evidence if the state has evidence that would be beneficial to the accused;

rather, the prosecutor has a constitutional duty to disclose it. 34
B. Kyles v. Whitley
In Kyles v. Whitley,35 the Supreme Court considered whether a
defendant's Fourteenth Amendment right was violated when the State failed
to disclose exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant.3 6 The Court
extended Agurs to include the disclosure of all exculpatory evidence known
by anyone "acting on the government's behalf' in a criminal investigation.37
The Court held that compliance with Brady imposes a duty on the individual
prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence and disclose it to the defense .38
" Compare Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (requiring government to proactively disclose all material
exculpatory evidence), with Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 (requiring disclosure of material exculpatory
evidence upon defendant's request).
14 See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107-11 (stating under materiality standard, prosecutor's duty not
limited to when defendant has requested favorable evidence).
15 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (holding prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence acquired
by entire investigation team). Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death. Id. at 421. Prior to trial, police had collected eyewitness statements containing physical
descriptions of the attacker which were inconsistent with characteristics of the petitioner. Id. at 423.
These statements were not disclosed to the defense. Id. at 428. The Court imposed an affirmative
duty on prosecutors to become aware of, and to disclose any favorable evidence held by others
acting on the government's behalf, including the police. Id. at 437.
36 See id.at 421-22. (holding prosecution's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence acquired by
entire investigation team). Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death.
Id. at 421. Prior to trial, police had collected eyewitness statements containing physical
descriptions of the attacker, which were inconsistent with characteristics of the petitioner. Id. at
423. These statements were not disclosed to the defense. Id. at 428. The court imposed an
affirmative duty on prosecutors to become aware of, and to disclose, any favorable evidence held
by others acting on the government's behalf, including the police. Id.at 437. The Court also
scrutinized the State's actions to determine whether the State violated the principle articulated in
Brady. Id. Both the nature of the evidence and the fact that Kyles was sentenced to death in a
second trial after the initial trial resulted in a hung jury, served to demonstrate the importance of
undisclosed exculpatory evidence in a trial. Id.at 421-22.
17 Id.at 437 (requiring prosecutorial burden to learn of any favorable evidence for defendant's
right to fair trial). Whitley explained this standard, stating "materiality" is met where "the favorable
evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine
confidence in the verdict." Id. at 435.
38 See id.at 437 (discussing prosecutors' duty to learn and disclose exculpatory information).
Moreover, Rule 3.8 of the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct states,
in pertinent part:
The prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
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This requirement applies to evidence known by anyone acting for the
government, even if it is unknown by the prosecution.3 9
Although
subsequent case law has refined the parameters of the Brady requirements,
there is no bright-line rule for Brady violations that are material in sentencing

the defendant.40
C. Cone v. Bell
Applying the Brady standard to the sentencing phase is perhaps the
most meaningful, yet least developed in case law; for example, in Cone v.
Bell,4 the Court determined whether the State's suppression of evidence that
corroborated the defendant's insanity was a Brady violation. The Supreme
Court held that Brady includes information that may not exculpate, but
nonetheless mitigates punishment.43 The Court reasoned that "[e]vidence
that is material to guilt will often be material for sentencing purposes as well;
the converse is not always true, however. . ."
The Court in Cone
emphasized this by vacating Cone's sentence.45 The Court stated that a
"reasonable probability" in the jury's deliberations at the sentencing phase

(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved
of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal ....
(2014 ).
" See Thitley, 514 U.S. at 437-39 (noting prosecutor has duty to learn information from any
state actors). The Court noted that the government's interest "'in a criminal prosecution is not that
it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."' Id. (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S.
78, 88 (1935)).
40 See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 322-23 (2006) (finding officers that
contaminated evidence to frame defendant is material Brady evidence). Brady misconduct
evidence is particularly relevant in cases in which the defense asserts that the government's case is
based on bias or other improper misconduct by all members of the prosecution team. Id. Defenses
grounded in wrongful government conduct include claims that the police fabricated or planted
evidence or that law enforcement officers plotted to "frame" or falsely implicate the defendant. Id.
41 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (stating courts failed to adequately consider whether documents were
material to sentencing).
42 See id. (including evidence of eyewitness statements supporting defendant's drug addiction
contention).
43 See id. at 475-76 (remanding for resentencing so jury's assessment of defendant's drug
addiction defense would include suppressed evidence).
44 Id. at 473 (discussing seminal case on release of prosecutorial evidence).
45 See Cone, 556 U.S. at 476; but see id. at 489 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (writing defense failed
to prove undisclosed evidence would have changed outcome of trial) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514
U.S. 419, 433-34). (1995)).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.12
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may have been compromised due to the suppressed witness statements,
46
police reports, and interview notes relating to Cone's drug use.
D. UnitedStates v. Valenzuela
The duty for prosecutors to disclose impeachment information was
reinforced in United States v. Valenzuela.47 Here, the court held that the
prosecutorial duty to supply defendants with impeachment information
included benefits sought and received, relating to the victims upon whom the
Probation Department and government relied to determine the applicable
guideline range. 48
III. BRADY AND HAMPTON
Furthermore, the Hampton court considered whether a state lab
chemist's willful tampering of evidence, including samples of cocaine
allegedly attributable to defendant, constituted a Brady violation. 49 Relying
on case law and a Brady-standard analysis, the court concluded that a
Brady violation existed because Dookhan was part of the prosecution team
in her role as the state lab chemist, and by tampering with the amount of
5
cocaine, she had prejudiced the defendant in his sentencing phase. 1
The court found that if the sentencing judge had known of the
Dookhan scandal and that Dookhan had worked on about two thirds of the
400 grams attributed to Hampton, there would be a reasonable probability
that the outcome of Hampton's sentencing would have been different.5'
52
Thus, the court held that Hampton successfully met the prejudice element.
Next, the court considered whether the conduct of Dookhan was imputed to

46

See id. at 469-72 (explaining evidence fell short of sustaining insanity defense).

47 No. CR 07-00011 MMM, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64070, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 14, 2009)

(stating government had greater ease of access to information).
48 See id. at *13-15.
Such information could include any doubt about government's
calculations of drug quantity, or any factors relevant to defendant's role, responsibility, or
sentencing discrepancies. Id.
41 See United States v. Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d 431, 437 (D. Mass. 2015) (deciding whether
Brady violation occurred if evidence considered favorable and material).
50 See id. at 436-40 (analyzing case under Brady ).
51 See id. at 18 (noting Judge Gertner imposed sentence reluctantly based on statutory
mandatory minimum corresponding to 280 grams); see also Sentencing Transcript at 3, 18, 21,
United States v. Valenzuela, (C. D. Cal. July 14, 2009) (ECF No. 76) (illustrating unfairness of

disparity between mandatory sentences for selling crack cocaine and cocaine powder).
52

See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (relying on lack of retesting and sentencing judge's

decision).
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the prosecution. 53 The court reasoned that given the unique facts of the case,
Dookhan's conduct, and her impeaching evidence as a pivotal state-witness,
it was the safer course to assume that duty attaches. 54 Thus, the court found
that the ruling was reasonable and just, in light of the government's refusal
to confront the issue through evidence, that Dookhan was a member of the
prosecution team; therefore, ruled there was a Brady violation.
Although the court declined to vacate Hampton's guilty plea in his
initial motion, it held that the Brady violation entitled Hampton to postconviction relief in the form of resentencing. 56 Consequently, the court
expanded Brady's application beyond the trial phase, acknowledging the
importance of Due Process rights in the sentencing phase.57 In explaining its
decision, the court said, "Hampton's habeas petition is not about his own
behavior in making a plea, but it is about the actual evidentiary basis
provided by the government for the imposition of a mandatory minimum. "58
The Brady requirement of disclosure was not limited to exculpatory evidence
used during the determination of guilt or innocence; at issue in Brady was
exculpatory evidence that affected sentencing. 59 A specific Brady request
should be made because the reliability of sentencing determinations made by
the judge is undermined if there is no duty for the state to disclose
exculpatory evidence to be used in the penalty phase.6" The absence of a duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence that the state will use in the penalty phase
of the plea undermines the reliability of sentencing determinations; thus,
such as when evidence that casts doubt on the government's calculations of
drug quantity or unwarranted sentencing disparities would include
impeachment material.6"
In the sentencing phase, the threshold to determine material
evidence is much lower than the pretrial or trial phase.6 2 While the trial phase
51 See id. at 439 (noting Brady requirement of prosecutor to learn favorable evidence).
54 See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Scott, 5 N.E. 3d 530, 535-36 (Mass. 2014) (finding

Dookhan member of prosecution team in deciding whether to vacate guilty pleas).
55 See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (finding including Dookhan as part of prosecution

reasonable and fair).
56 See id.
57 See id. at 43 8-40 (imputing Dookhan's actions to prosecution team).
58 See id. at 437 (distinguishing case from Wilkens I.)
51 See id. (finding "evidence can be material either to guilt or punishment").
60 See State v. Hamilton, 478 So. 2d 123, 125 (La. 1985) (requiring sentencing phase to be

retried based on evidence that sufficiently prejudiced the defendant).
61 See United States v. Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257, 1259 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding withholding
material evidence pertaining to sentence to be vacated); see also United States v. Quinn, 537 F.
Supp. 2d 99, 118 (D. D.C. 2008) (holding Brady violation occurred, but new trial unwarranted as

remedy).
62 See Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 474 (2009) (outlinging less stringent standard at sentencing
than guilt phase). Cf Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 474 (2009) ("There is a critical difference
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requires materiality to impact a guilty finding beyond a reasonable doubt; in
the sentencing phase a guideline enhancement or mitigating evidence is
proved by preponderance of the evidence. 63 Here, the court correctly
concluded that Hampton's due process rights were violated because the
judge imposed the mandatory minimum sentence based on unreliable
information provided by the government and their failure to disclose such
exculpatory information.64 Although the court failed to establish a specific
remedy for future courts to follow in cases where sentences were
unconstitutionally imposed, the remedy should adequately cure any
prejudice caused by prosecutorial nondisclosure of post-conviction
evidence.65
In Hampton, the court held that the state's failure to disclose
information of Dookhan's willful tampering of evidence amounted to a
Brady violation. Effectively, the court acknowledged the importance of
extending the scope of Brady to sentencing. Thus, the next step is to
establish a constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence discovered
post-conviction to complete the Brady requirements. An extension of Brady
would ensure justice and fairness for those seeking relief from constitutional
violations.
Natasha A. Desa

between the high standard Cone was required to satisfy to establish insanity as a matter of
Tennessee law and the far lesser standard that a defendant must satisfy to qualify evidence as
mitigating in a penalty hearing in a capital case.").
63 See id. ("There is a critical difference between the high standard Cone was required to satisfy
to establish insanity as a matter of Tennessee law and the far lesser standard that a defendant must
satisfy to qualify evidence as mitigating in a penalty hearing in a capital case.").
64 See Hampton, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (finding Hampton's sentence unconstitutional based
on Brady violation)
65 See id. at 43 8-40 (outlining reasons for resentencing).

